Referendum Law Sent Back and Dialogue Ultimatum Shape Mid-August Political Standoff

Kinshasa, DRC, August 14, 2026 - Mid-August politics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo crystallised around two interlocking tracks: the fate of the referendum-organisation law and the still-unsigned national dialogue that President Félix Tshisekedi endorsed after meeting church leaders. On August 13 the National Assembly bureau said the head of state had, by letter dated August 10 under Article 137 of the Constitution, asked both chambers for a fresh deliberation of the law after Constitutional Court ruling R.Const. 2695 of July 28 found the text conforming while attaching thirteen interpretive reservations that imply deletions, substitutions and rewrites. Parliament scheduled the new reading for the September 2026 session. Author Paul-Gaspard Ngondankoy welcomed the step as a way to write the Court’s clauses into the statute so implementing bodies need not keep citing the judgment. Lamuka spokesperson Prince Epenge called the return “a small step in the right direction,” urged Union Sacrée deputies to stick to constitutionally limited referendum subjects, and said the C64 would reassess the national picture on August 15.

That deadline had been set by the Article 64 coalition after it froze street action against constitutional change once churches announced an inclusive dialogue. On August 4 Alain Bolodjwa quit the C64, arguing the platform had drifted from defending the constitutional order into “begging” for dialogue and had mishandled the earlier anti-referendum mobilisation calendar. Government messaging, voiced earlier by spokesperson Patrick Muyaya, keeps the AFC/M23 out of the domestic forum: Washington covers Rwanda, Doha covers the rebellion’s eight protocols, and the internal dialogue is cast as a Congolese front against what Kinshasa calls Rwandan aggression. Moïse Katumbi’s Ensemble, through Olivier Kamitatu, conditioned participation on true inclusivity-including armed actors where relevant-no constitutional rewrite at the table, international facilitation, and treatment of root causes amid millions of displaced people. On August 1 Joseph Kabila’s Sauvons la RDC, speaking through Moïse Nyarugabo, backed dialogue in principle but listed seven hard conditions: AU/UN-backed neutral mediation, full inclusivity, a third-country venue, consensual agenda, binding resolutions respecting term limits and abandonment of any constitutional-change referendum before talks, political de-escalation measures, and an African-international follow-up mechanism-while rejecting any process run under Tshisekedi’s authority. Jean-Claude Vuemba denied that the platform is allied with the rebellion and said Nyarugabo’s presence near AFC-held areas was personal, not organisational. Late July, Katumbi had already repaired an internal Ensemble rift between Kamitatu and Senator Salomon Idi Kalonda after a joint statement said misunderstandings were cleared.

Around the same cluster, about sixty-four civic groups including LUCHA and Filimbi on August 10 asked Tshisekedi not to promulgate the referendum law despite the Court’s conditional green light, arguing peace, sovereignty, humanitarian response and elections should come first. The one-year mark of the Suminwa II cabinet the same day underlined a parallel paradox: IMF and World Bank readings still point to growth above 5% driven by mining, while a CEPAS-backed civil-society monitor put Council of Ministers decision execution at roughly 25% for April-December 2025. On August 11 Tshisekedi met Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso in Brazzaville as regional consultations continued with Burundi and Angola. MP Théo Ngwabidje Kasi published five dialogue priorities-clear multi-dimensional goals, real participation by security-relevant actors, the lived reality of eastern displaced communities, peace as an accelerator of the presidential programme, and a post-dialogue follow-up calendar-while warning against early red lines and confusing dialogue with forced adhesion. As August 15 arrived, the ordinance formally opening the forum was still awaited, and the gap between Kinshasa’s security-first frame and opposition/civic demands for an internationally facilitated, constitution-preserving process remained the core political risk.