DRC’s Size Used as a Pretext for Tshisekedi’s Failure to Protect Citizens

January 4, 2026- The sheer size of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is increasingly being used as a pretext to justify President Félix Tshisekedi’s persistent inability to guarantee security for the Congolese people. As insecurity continues to worsen in eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivu region, senior officials have repeatedly argued that the country’s vast territory is responsible for decades of instability. A recurring narrative among DRC leaders is that the Congo is simply too large to govern effectively. This argument has been frequently invoked by President Tshisekedi to explain the ongoing violence. In 2022, he publicly claimed that the country’s security challenges stem from its size, insisting that the national army could not be deployed everywhere to fight armed groups such as the ADF, an Islamic State-linked Ugandan militia, and other insurgents operating on Congolese soil. Despite numbering around 130,000 troops, the FARDC is plagued by low morale, inadequate training, weak command structures, ethnic discrimination, corruption, and the integration of the FDLR, a Rwandan militia responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, incorporated under Tshisekedi’s authority. Tshisekedi’s reliance on Burundian troops, the Wazalendo militia, European mercenaries, and SADC forces has steadily declined, particularly after South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania withdrew their contingents following military setbacks against the AFC/M23. Some analysts now question whether Tshisekedi fully understood the vastness of the Congolese territory before assuming office, when he promised to restore security nationwide, or whether this reality only became apparent to him after taking power. Others openly question his true intentions regarding the country’s territorial integrity, wondering whether a reduction in size might better serve his political interests. As the saying goes, a leader is one who knows the way, walks the way, and shows the way. The conduct of Tshisekedi and his inner circle suggests that the crisis in eastern DRC is of little concern, as long as Kinshasa remains untouched. In a statement issued on November 26, government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya claimed that the Kivu regions affected by insecurity represent only a small portion of the DRC. “What does 2,345,000 square kilometers really mean?” he asked, adding that foreigners often exaggerate the conflict by saying, “There is war in the DRC,” while visitors to Kinshasa are surprised to find calm in the capital. Such remarks have reinforced the perception that the Tshisekedi administration has never prioritized the well-being of populations in eastern DRC. In 2025, Brigadier General Eddy Kapend, commander of the 22nd Military Region, openly stated that the country was not concerned by the occupation of parts of eastern DRC by AFC/M23 fighters, stressing instead that the real issue would be their presence in Katanga province. He further noted that there were no major concerns as long as Katanga remained untouched. That same year, Anthony Nkinzo Kamole, Chief of Staff to the Presidency, declared during an interview that the conflict in eastern DRC was happening 2,000 kilometers away, describing the eastern regions as “foreign zones”, while Kinshasa was considered their country. These statements echo similar remarks made by Tshisekedi, Muyaya, General Kapend, Nkinzo, and others, including Jules Alingete, the Auditor General, who once said that the war was 2,000 kilometers from Kinshasa and that “we only see it on television”. Such views underscore a deep disconnect from the realities faced by eastern populations. Beyond the argument of territorial size, another frequent strategy has been to blame Rwanda for all problems, allowing the Congolese government to avoid acknowledging its own failures. Eastern DRC has become a battleground for more than 260 armed groups, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, mass rapes, forced recruitment of children, and the displacement of millions, both internally and abroad. Tshisekedi has further exacerbated the crisis by arming groups accused of serious human rights violations to support the FARDC against the AFC/M23, a movement that claims to be fighting against the genocide of Congolese Tutsis allegedly perpetrated by the Kinshasa government. The FDLR, which invaded Rwanda in 1994, continues to be deeply entrenched within the Congolese army and is actively involved in arming the predominantly civilian Wazalendo movement. To date, Tshisekedi has shown no clear political will to end the war or restore peace. He appears largely indifferent to the fate of Congolese refugees and civilians who continue to risk their lives daily amid the conflict. Sheltered more than 2,000 kilometers away from the frontlines, the president has repeatedly minimized the crisis by arguing that the affected areas are too small to matter. Critics argue that he is now using the war in eastern DRC as a political tool, exploiting the ongoing instability to justify extending his hold on power.

Faits rapportés

January 4, 2026- The sheer size of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is increasingly being used as a pretext to justify President Félix Tshisekedi’s persistent inability to guarantee security for the Congolese people. As insecurity continues to worsen in eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivu region, senior officials have repeatedly argued that the country’s vast territory is responsible for decades of instability. A recurring narrative among DRC leaders is that the Congo is simply too large to govern effectively. This argument has been frequently invoked by President Tshisekedi to explain the ongoing violence. In 2022, he publicly claimed that the country’s security challenges stem from its size, insisting that the national army could not be deployed everywhere to fight armed groups such as the ADF, an Islamic State-linked Ugandan militia, and other insurgents operating on Congolese soil. Despite numbering around 130,000 troops, the FARDC is plagued by low morale, inadequate training, weak command structures, ethnic discrimination, corruption, and the integration of the FDLR, a Rwandan militia responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, incorporated under Tshisekedi’s authority. Tshisekedi’s reliance on Burundian troops, the Wazalendo militia, European mercenaries, and SADC forces has steadily declined, particularly after South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania withdrew their contingents following military setbacks against the AFC/M23. Some analysts now question whether Tshisekedi fully understood the vastness of the Congolese territory before assuming office, when he promised to restore security nationwide, or whether this reality only became apparent to him after taking power. Others openly question his true intentions regarding the country’s territorial integrity, wondering whether a reduction in size might better serve his political interests. As the saying goes, a leader is one who knows the way, walks the way, and shows the way. The conduct of Tshisekedi and his inner circle suggests that the crisis in eastern DRC is of little concern, as long as Kinshasa remains untouched. In a statement issued on November 26, government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya claimed that the Kivu regions affected by insecurity represent only a small portion of the DRC. “What does 2,345,000 square kilometers really mean?” he asked, adding that foreigners often exaggerate the conflict by saying, “There is war in the DRC,” while visitors to Kinshasa are surprised to find calm in the capital. Such remarks have reinforced the perception that the Tshisekedi administration has never prioritized the well-being of populations in eastern DRC. In 2025, Brigadier General Eddy Kapend, commander of the 22nd Military Region, openly stated that the country was not concerned by the occupation of parts of eastern DRC by AFC/M23 fighters, stressing instead that the real issue would be their presence in Katanga province. He further noted that there were no major concerns as long as Katanga remained untouched. That same year, Anthony Nkinzo Kamole, Chief of Staff to the Presidency, declared during an interview that the conflict in eastern DRC was happening 2,000 kilometers away, describing the eastern regions as “foreign zones”, while Kinshasa was considered their country. These statements echo similar remarks made by Tshisekedi, Muyaya, General Kapend, Nkinzo, and others, including Jules Alingete, the Auditor General, who once said that the war was 2,000 kilometers from Kinshasa and that “we only see it on television”. Such views underscore a deep disconnect from the realities faced by eastern populations. Beyond the argument of territorial size, another frequent strategy has been to blame Rwanda for all problems, allowing the Congolese government to avoid acknowledging its own failures. Eastern DRC has become a battleground for more than 260 armed groups, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, mass rapes, forced recruitment of children, and the displacement of millions, both internally and abroad. Tshisekedi has further exacerbated the crisis by arming groups accused of serious human rights violations to support the FARDC against the AFC/M23, a movement that claims to be fighting against the genocide of Congolese Tutsis allegedly perpetrated by the Kinshasa government. The FDLR, which invaded Rwanda in 1994, continues to be deeply entrenched within the Congolese army and is actively involved in arming the predominantly civilian Wazalendo movement. To date, Tshisekedi has shown no clear political will to end the war or restore peace. He appears largely indifferent to the fate of Congolese refugees and civilians who continue to risk their lives daily amid the conflict. Sheltered more than 2,000 kilometers away from the frontlines, the president has repeatedly minimized the crisis by arguing that the affected areas are too small to matter. Critics argue that he is now using the war in eastern DRC as a political tool, exploiting the ongoing instability to justify extending his hold on power.