DRC Distributes Cash to Soldiers and Wazalendo Amid Ongoing Battles

South Kivu, DRC - February 21, 2026 - The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government has begun distributing cash payments to its national army soldiers and Wazalendo fighters actively engaged against the AFC/M23 coalition in South Kivu province. The distribution started on 11 February 2026, following a visit by a Ministry of Defense team to Uvira on February 10. According to reports, each DRC soldier received $400, while Wazalendo fighters were given $200 each. The Ministry’s team was reportedly divided into six groups to monitor payments in Uvira, the Rusizi Valley, Baraka, Fizi, Minembwe, and Makobola. The cash distribution follows AFC/M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and coincides with the DRC government’s intensified efforts to reclaim lost territory. Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, appointed to South Kivu province, reiterated that President Félix Tshisekedi intends to retake Kamanyola, Bukavu, Goma, and Bunagana, emphasizing that the army would advance in the coming days. Since late January, clashes have escalated across South Kivu, including Sange, Mukoko, Gakenke, Point-Zéro, Rugezi, Biziba, Kundondo, Mitamba, and Kirungwa. On 17 February, DRC and Wazalendo forces attacked AFC/M23 positions in the Mulenge and Lemera highlands, supported by Burundian troops. On 18 February, coalition forces targeted MRDP-Twirwaneho positions in Minembwe commune, while AFC/M23 positions near the Lemera football stadium were also attacked. These operations have involved heavy weaponry, warplanes, and drones, despite ongoing regional and international diplomatic efforts to halt fighting. Although President Tshisekedi accepted the principle of a ceasefire proposed by Angola on 13 February, attacks on AFC/M23, Twirwaneho positions, and civilian homes continued before and after the proposed date. Political analysts suggest that Tshisekedi’s strategy-simultaneously escalating military operations while showing readiness for dialogue-is aimed at consolidating the DRC government’s leverage ahead of potential peace talks. They urge regional and international mediators to take concrete steps to curb violence rather than relying on declarations alone. CONCLUSION This period was marked by a complex interplay of escalating military operations and high-stakes diplomacy in the Great Lakes region. Although President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC publicly accepted an Angola-brokered ceasefire scheduled for 18 February 2026, its effectiveness remained uncertain as military actions-including drone strikes and airstrikes-continued against AFC/M23 and Twirwaneho positions. Rwanda expressed skepticism about Kinshasa’s commitment to peace, citing the DRC’s ongoing use of heavy artillery, airstrikes, and foreign mercenaries. Security concerns remained deep-rooted. Rwanda, supported by members of the U.S. Congress, highlighted the DRC’s alleged continued cooperation with the FDLR, a group linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Kigali stated that its defensive measures would only be lifted once the FDLR is fully dismantled. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in South Kivu deteriorated, with Banyamulenge civilians targeted through drone attacks and the burning of homes, prompting condemnation and accusations of genocide from political leaders and community organizations. Beyond the conflict, Rwanda remained active on the international stage, advancing strategic, technological, and social initiatives: Strengthened global ties: The opening of a new Danish embassy in Kigali and continued bilateral cooperation with Barbados and Italy. Technological and social progress: Talks with Russia on developing nuclear energy and the launch of the digital consular platform “Nshuti” to support the Rwandan diaspora. National unity and reconciliation: Efforts to reintegrate former combatants and genocide convicts, promoting a unified Rwandan identity (“Ndi Umunyarwanda”) to counter lingering genocide ideology. In conclusion, while Rwanda continues to advance internal development and international partnerships, the regional security landscape remains volatile, characterized by mutual distrust between Kinshasa and Kigali and highlighting the urgent need for impartial international mediation to address the root causes of the violence. By Jeff Buleli

Faits rapportés

South Kivu, DRC - February 21, 2026 - The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government has begun distributing cash payments to its national army soldiers and Wazalendo fighters actively engaged against the AFC/M23 coalition in South Kivu province. The distribution started on 11 February 2026, following a visit by a Ministry of Defense team to Uvira on February 10. According to reports, each DRC soldier received $400, while Wazalendo fighters were given $200 each. The Ministry’s team was reportedly divided into six groups to monitor payments in Uvira, the Rusizi Valley, Baraka, Fizi, Minembwe, and Makobola. The cash distribution follows AFC/M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and coincides with the DRC government’s intensified efforts to reclaim lost territory. Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, appointed to South Kivu province, reiterated that President Félix Tshisekedi intends to retake Kamanyola, Bukavu, Goma, and Bunagana, emphasizing that the army would advance in the coming days. Since late January, clashes have escalated across South Kivu, including Sange, Mukoko, Gakenke, Point-Zéro, Rugezi, Biziba, Kundondo, Mitamba, and Kirungwa. On 17 February, DRC and Wazalendo forces attacked AFC/M23 positions in the Mulenge and Lemera highlands, supported by Burundian troops. On 18 February, coalition forces targeted MRDP-Twirwaneho positions in Minembwe commune, while AFC/M23 positions near the Lemera football stadium were also attacked. These operations have involved heavy weaponry, warplanes, and drones, despite ongoing regional and international diplomatic efforts to halt fighting. Although President Tshisekedi accepted the principle of a ceasefire proposed by Angola on 13 February, attacks on AFC/M23, Twirwaneho positions, and civilian homes continued before and after the proposed date. Political analysts suggest that Tshisekedi’s strategy-simultaneously escalating military operations while showing readiness for dialogue-is aimed at consolidating the DRC government’s leverage ahead of potential peace talks. They urge regional and international mediators to take concrete steps to curb violence rather than relying on declarations alone. CONCLUSION This period was marked by a complex interplay of escalating military operations and high-stakes diplomacy in the Great Lakes region. Although President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC publicly accepted an Angola-brokered ceasefire scheduled for 18 February 2026, its effectiveness remained uncertain as military actions-including drone strikes and airstrikes-continued against AFC/M23 and Twirwaneho positions. Rwanda expressed skepticism about Kinshasa’s commitment to peace, citing the DRC’s ongoing use of heavy artillery, airstrikes, and foreign mercenaries. Security concerns remained deep-rooted. Rwanda, supported by members of the U.S. Congress, highlighted the DRC’s alleged continued cooperation with the FDLR, a group linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Kigali stated that its defensive measures would only be lifted once the FDLR is fully dismantled. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in South Kivu deteriorated, with Banyamulenge civilians targeted through drone attacks and the burning of homes, prompting condemnation and accusations of genocide from political leaders and community organizations. Beyond the conflict, Rwanda remained active on the international stage, advancing strategic, technological, and social initiatives: Strengthened global ties: The opening of a new Danish embassy in Kigali and continued bilateral cooperation with Barbados and Italy. Technological and social progress: Talks with Russia on developing nuclear energy and the launch of the digital consular platform “Nshuti” to support the Rwandan diaspora. National unity and reconciliation: Efforts to reintegrate former combatants and genocide convicts, promoting a unified Rwandan identity (“Ndi Umunyarwanda”) to counter lingering genocide ideology. In conclusion, while Rwanda continues to advance internal development and international partnerships, the regional security landscape remains volatile, characterized by mutual distrust between Kinshasa and Kigali and highlighting the urgent need for impartial international mediation to address the root causes of the violence. By Jeff Buleli